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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
School-age refugees facing language barriers asked the 
District Court for a preliminary injunction compelling the 
School District of Lancaster to allow them to transfer from 
Phoenix Academy, an accelerated credit-recovery high 
school, to McCaskey High School’s International School, a 
program designed principally to teach language skills to 
English language learners, or ELLs. The District Court 
granted that request, finding likely violations of Pennsylvania 
law and a provision of a federal statute we’ve never 
addressed—the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 
(EEOA), 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). The School District appeals, 
asking us to vacate that order. We will affirm based on the 
EEOA violations but not on the state law violations. 
I 
A 
The named plaintiffs, now the appellees, are 
immigrants, ages 18 to 21. They fled war, violence, and 
persecution in their native countries to come to the United 
States, arriving here since 2014. International refugee 
agencies resettled them in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. None are 
native English speakers. As students, all fall within a 
subgroup of ELLs called SLIFE—students with limited or 
interrupted formal education. SLIFE are English language 
learners who are two or more years behind their appropriate 
grade level, possess limited or no literacy in any language, 
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have limited or interrupted formal educational backgrounds, 
and have endured stressful experiences causing acculturation 
challenges. The named plaintiffs embody these traits. 
Born in January 1998, Khadidja Issa, 19, fled Sudan 
when she was 5 to escape “insecurity” under President Omar 
al-Bashir. J.A. 568–69, 980. Until age 17, she lived in refugee 
camps in Chad where she received her only prior schooling. 
Her native language is Fur. She also speaks Arabic. After 
immigrating here in October 2015, she was resettled with her 
family in Lancaster. When she first arrived, she couldn’t 
speak, read, write, or understand any English. She’s eligible 
to attend public school in Pennsylvania through 2019, the 
year she turns 21.1 
Qasin Hassan (or Q. M. H.), 18, was born in Somalia 
in September 1998. When he was 12, al-Shabaab militants 
killed his father. He fled to Egypt. A native Somali speaker, 
he took private lessons at home and learned “a little bit” of 
Arabic, but he wasn’t accepted into Egyptian schools. J.A. 
575. He arrived in Lancaster with his family in September 
2015 speaking only “a few words” of English. Id. Like Issa, 
he’s eligible to attend public school in Pennsylvania through 
2019, the year he turns 21. 
                                              
1 Pennsylvania law provides that “[e]very child” 
between ages 6 and 21 “may attend the public schools in his 
district” and that a child who reaches age 21 “during the 
school term and who has not graduated from high school may 
continue to attend the public schools in his district free of 
charge until the end of the school term.” 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-
1301. “A child’s right to be admitted to school may not be 
conditioned on the child’s immigration status.” 22 Pa. Code § 
11.11(d).  
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Sisters Sui Hnem Sung and Van Ni Iang (or V. N. I.), 
born in October 1996 and October 1998, fled Burma when 
their father was forced into labor there. Sung, 20, and Iang, 
18, arrived with their family in Lancaster in November 2015. 
By then, Sung had completed ninth grade and Iang eighth, but 
neither spoke or understood any English. Their native 
language is Hakha Chin. Sung is eligible to attend public 
school in Pennsylvania through 2017, the year she turns 21, 
and Iang is eligible through 2019, when she turns 21.   
War forced brothers Alembe and Anyemu Dunia, ages 
21 and 19, to flee “very bad” circumstances in Tanzania to 
Mozambique, where life in refugee camps remained “very 
bad” and “very difficult.” J.A. 615–16, 618. Native Swahili 
speakers, they were taught in Portuguese until the eighth or 
ninth grade when they could no longer afford schooling. With 
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their family, they arrived in Lancaster in November 2014 
speaking “just basic” English, like “hello” and “hi.” J.A. 618.2 
The International School and Phoenix Academy 
The School District of Lancaster, the appellant in this 
case, administers numerous schools. Two are relevant here: 
McCaskey High School, which the School District operates 
directly, and Phoenix Academy, operated by Camelot Schools 
                                              
2 After the preliminary injunction issued, Alembe and 
Anyemu Dunia decided they no longer wished to attend 
school in the School District. Alembe is now 21 and Anyemu 
already earned a high school diploma at Phoenix, so both 
“wish to further their education at community college.” 
Appellees’ Resp. to Stay Mot. 4 n.2. Though the complaint’s 
request for “supplemental educational services” as 
compensatory relief for the School District’s alleged 
violations (J.A. 97) might in other circumstances sustain a 
live claim, here, the brothers have “chose[n] not to enroll” 
and disavowed any intention to “further their education” 
within the School District. Appellees’ Resp. to Stay Mot. 4 
n.2. Their claims for equitable relief are therefore moot. See 
Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016) 
(“If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a 
personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, at any point 
during litigation, [his or her claims] can no longer proceed 
and must be dismissed as moot.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). On remand, the District Court should dismiss them 
as such. Nevertheless, because the brothers’ testimony and 
other evidence about their experiences with the School 
District formed, in part, the basis for this preliminary 
injunction, we consider it on appeal.  
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of Pennsylvania, LLC, a private, for-profit company under 
contract with the School District.  
McCaskey High School consists of two smaller 
schools. One is J.P. McCaskey, a traditional public high 
school. The other is McCaskey East, known as the 
International School. The International School is a program 
designed primarily to teach language skills to students who 
speak little, if any, English.3 Those students generally attend 
the International School for one year, after which they join 
J.P. McCaskey’s general population. During that year, they 
receive “intensive ESL” (English as a second language) 
support through two 48-minute ESL courses per day. J.A. 
901, 1071. For “content” classes—science, math, social 
studies, and other “enrichment subjects”—ELLs at the 
International School receive “content-based ESL” teaching 
through a method called “sheltered instruction.” J.A. 901. 
Under that method, ELLs, including SLIFE, are grouped 
together in content courses with other ELLs at comparable 
English-proficiency levels. ELLs are hence “sheltered” in 
those classes from other ELLs at higher proficiency levels 
and from native English speakers. To foster English-language 
proficiency, the International School also introduces ELLs to 
new American “cultural values and beliefs” while respecting 
their “cultural diversity” and embraces “close communication 
                                              
3 Under 22 Pa. Code § 4.26, “[e]very school district shall 
provide a program for each student whose dominant language 
is not English for the purpose of facilitating the student’s 
achievement of English proficiency and the academic 
standards” of 22 Pa. Code § 4.12. Programs “shall include 
appropriate bilingual-bicultural or English as a second 
language (ESL) instruction.” Id. § 4.26. 
9 
 
with families” and “access to appropriate translation 
services.” Id. 
Phoenix Academy is, as the District Court said, “a 
little different.” Issa v. Sch. Dist. of Lancaster, No. 16-3881, 
2016 WL 4493202, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2016). It’s an 
“alternative education program” intended to serve “at-risk 
Students” over-age for their grade, under-credited, and in 
danger of not graduating high school before they age out of 
public-school eligibility at 21. J.A. 904, 910. Phoenix’s 
principal missions are to ensure that students accumulate 
enough credits to graduate and to change students’ negative 
behaviors—not to further their academic proficiencies. A 
significant portion of grading is therefore based on students’ 
behavior and attendance, known as “seat time.” J.A. 544, 639. 
In step with its mission to change students’ “anti-social” 
behaviors, J.A. 1039, Phoenix enforces stringent security 
measures not in effect at McCaskey, including daily pat-down 
searches. Phoenix bars its students from bringing in or out 
any personal belongings, like backpacks, food, books, and 
even homework. And a strict dress code is in place. Based on 
a hierarchical system, students are rewarded with different 
colored shirts as they demonstrate improved behavior.  
Teaching is also different at Phoenix. All Phoenix 
students, including ELLs, take an accelerated curriculum 
allowing them to earn a high school diploma in roughly half 
(but sometimes less than half) the time of a traditional four-
year high school, like McCaskey. Phoenix students take five 
80-minute classes per day, generally completing each class in 
half an academic year (90 days). McCaskey students, in 
contrast, take seven 48-minute classes per day, generally 
completing each class in a full academic year (180 days). 
Under these different schedules, McCaskey students receive 
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about 1,440 more minutes, or twenty-four more hours, of 
instruction per class than do students at Phoenix, the 
equivalent of about thirty more 48-minute class periods per 
class. The upshot is, as one former Phoenix teacher put it, that 
Phoenix’s curriculum must be taught “double time.” J.A. 632. 
Phoenix’s program for teaching English to ELLs also 
differs from the International School’s. Phoenix offers ELLs 
of all levels, with no special accommodations for SLIFE, one 
80-minute ESL course per day. Otherwise, ELLs, including 
SLIFE, take all their content courses—science, math, social 
studies—with Phoenix’s general population under the 
accelerated model. In those content classes, ELLs aren’t 
sheltered from each other by their English proficiency or from 
native English speakers like they are at the International 
School. 
How does the School District empirically evaluate the 
efficacy of Phoenix’s ESL program? It doesn’t. The School 
District does not assess in any measurable way whether 
Phoenix’s program helps ELLs overcome their language 
barriers. It hasn’t attempted to weigh concretely the impact 
Phoenix’s accelerated, non-sheltered program has on ELLs, 
including SLIFE. Raw data about Phoenix’s ESL program 
apparently exists. But the School District doesn’t 
disaggregate it from data about the International School’s 
ESL program. Because the two programs rely on different 
ESL teaching methods, commingling the data means the 
School District cannot quantify whether Phoenix’s ESL 
program is successful.  
The School District’s Enrollment Policies and Practices 
Enrollment in Phoenix rather than McCaskey is 
usually a choice offered to students and their families. But 
one group of prospective students isn’t offered that choice: 
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new-to-the-District students over age 17 and under-credited. 
For students in that category (which included the plaintiffs), 
the choice is made for them: The School District unilaterally 
assigns them to Phoenix and doesn’t allow them to transfer to 
McCaskey. This mandatory enrollment rule applies regardless 
of a student’s English proficiency or educational background 
and even if the student has several years of public school 
eligibility left under Pennsylvania law. The School District 
does this, it says, because these students represent a higher 
risk of dropping out or aging out at age 21 before earning a 
high school diploma, which is a prerequisite for future 
advancement. But the School District’s funding and 
evaluations also turn, in part, on its graduation rates, which 
decline when students drop out or age out at 21. 
Actual enrollment at Phoenix hasn’t been a smooth 
process for these plaintiffs. While the School District 
unilaterally assigned them to Phoenix under the mandatory 
enrollment rule, their actual placement there proved far more 
difficult. They experienced significant delays between when 
they applied for enrollment and when they were either 
allowed to attend Phoenix or denied enrollment outright. The 
District Court said it well: In “no case” did the School District 
“accomplish the enrollment of the plaintiffs within the five-
day period mandated by state law.” Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, 
at *2. Iang and Sung were not permitted to start at Phoenix 
until December 2015 and February 2016, though they 
enrolled in November 2015. Issa enrolled in November 2015 
but wasn’t allowed to start at Phoenix until February 2016. 
Hassan was initially denied enrollment outright. He was later 
enrolled when the School District learned he was 17, not 19, a 
factor with “no legal significance” under Pennsylvania law. 
Id. And by when the injunction issued in late-August 2016, 
the School District had yet to enroll Alembe Dunia, despite 
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his “repeated attempts to enroll dating back to at least January 
2015.” Id. 
How Attending Phoenix Affected the Plaintiffs 
For those plaintiffs ultimately admitted to Phoenix, a 
“common complaint” was that they didn’t understand the 
“vast majority” of content taught in their non-ESL classes. 
Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *3. The plaintiffs all testified—
through interpreters—that Phoenix’s accelerated curriculum 
moved too quickly for them to grasp. Apart from their 
Phoenix ESL courses, the plaintiffs explained, they couldn’t 
understand most of what their teachers and classmates were 
saying. Despite these difficulties, they accrued credits and 
advanced to higher grade levels.  
Through her interpreter, Issa testified that Phoenix’s 
classes went “very fast” and she didn’t “understand 
anything.” J.A. 572–73. She felt she wasn’t “benefiting” there 
and wanted to attend a school “slower in pace.” J.A. 573. 
When asked, she couldn’t explain what two of her classes 
were about. In those classes, she said, her teachers and 
classmates spoke and wrote only in English, which she 
couldn’t understand. Nevertheless, she was promoted to the 
next grade. Of eighty-four students in her class, she was 
ranked first. 
Hassan testified through his interpreter that learning at 
Phoenix was “impossible” and he only understood his ESL 
teacher. J.A. 580. He couldn’t understand his content-class 
teachers or classmates.  
Through their interpreter, Iang and Sung explained 
they too had great difficulty understanding their content 
classes at Phoenix because they were all taught in English. 
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They couldn’t understand their teachers or classmates, and 
there were “never” interpreters there to help. J.A. 558.  
Anyemu Dunia graduated from Phoenix during the 
evidentiary hearing, earning a diploma in just sixteen months. 
He did so although he arrived in the United States without 
any academic credits or English-language proficiency, all 
while amassing forty-seven total absences. Despite his 
“readily apparent difficulties conversing in English” and his 
testimony that Phoenix’s classes moved too “fast” for him, he 
graduated sixth in his class of 107. Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, 
at *3 & n.2; see J.A. 620, 1357. 
B 
In July 2016, the plaintiffs sued the School District in 
the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
requesting a preliminary injunction allowing them and 
similarly situated ELLs to enroll in and attend McCaskey. On 
behalf of a putative class, they allege violations of the EEOA, 
20 U.S.C. § 1703(f); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.; the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses; and 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-
1301 of the Pennsylvania Public School Code of 1949 and 
various Pennsylvania regulations. 
Following expedited discovery on the plaintiffs’ 
preliminary-injunction motion, the District Court held a five-
day evidentiary hearing. Eighteen witnesses testified and 
dozens of exhibits were entered into evidence. The plaintiffs’ 
expert, Dr. Helaine Marshall, a specialist in teaching English 
to speakers of other languages (TESOL) and teaching ESL to 
SLIFE, testified at length.  
On August 26, 2016, the District Court granted the 
plaintiffs’ preliminary-injunction motion, finding likely 
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violations of the EEOA and state law. Issa, 2016 WL 
4493202; see Order, 2016 WL 4493201.4 On the plaintiffs’ 
EEOA claims, the District Court held that the School District 
failed on prongs one and three of the three-part test penned in 
Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1009–10 (5th Cir. 1981), 
a case we discuss in detail below. On their state law claims, 
the District Court found likely violations of the Public School 
Code and regulations in light of the School District’s 
enrollment delays. It entered the following order: 
[P]ending final resolution of this matter, the 
school district shall: 
1. Enroll and permit the school-age plaintiffs, 
who so wish, to attend the main high school, 
McCaskey, beginning on August 29, 2016; 
2. Ensure that all plaintiffs are properly 
assessed for language proficiency and receive 
an appropriate and adequate program of 
language instruction, including assignment to 
the International School if appropriate, ESL 
instruction, modifications in the delivery of 
instruction and testing to facilitate their 
achievement of English proficiency and state 
academic standards, and interpretation and 
translation services, as required by law, to 
enable the plaintiffs and their parents to 
                                              
4 The District Court found it “unnecessary” to address 
the plaintiffs’ “Title VI and constitutional claims” because 
relief granted on the EEOA and state law claims was 
“sufficient to resolve” the preliminary-injunction motion. 
Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *4. That conclusion is 
unchallenged on appeal. 
15 
 
meaningfully participate in education 
decisions; 
3. Ensure that the plaintiffs have equal access 
to the full range of educational opportunities 
provided to their peers, including curricular 
and non-curricular programs and activities; 
and 
4. The plaintiffs shall post a nominal bond of 
$1.00. 
Order, 2016 WL 4493201, at *1. The District Court deferred 
deciding the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification but 
urged the School District to “fairly apply” its preliminary-
injunction order to “school-age refugees similarly situated” to 
the plaintiffs in “language proficiency.” Id. at *1 n.1. 
The School District filed this timely appeal, asking our 
Court to stay the injunction’s enforcement. It informed us 
that, as of September 16, 2016, four of six named plaintiffs—
excluding Alembe and Anyemu Dunia—and five similarly 
situated ELLs transferred to the International School after the 
injunction issued, one of whom requested reinstatement at 
Phoenix. Appellant’s Resp. to Sep. 16, 2016 Order 1; see 
supra note 2. Later, our Court denied the School District’s 
stay motion and ordered expedited briefing. The United States 
Department of Justice filed an amicus brief supporting the 
plaintiffs.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1367(a). We have jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). D.M. v. 
N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 801 F.3d 205, 211 (3d Cir. 2015).  
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At the outset, we underscore the School District’s 
heavy burden on appeal. In reviewing a preliminary-
injunction order, findings of fact are assessed for clear error, 
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, and the ultimate 
decision to grant relief is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Del. Strong Families v. Attorney Gen. of Del., 793 F.3d 304, 
308 (3d Cir. 2015). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only 
if it’s “completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support 
displaying some hue of credibility or bears no rational 
relationship to the supportive evidentiary data.” Havens v. 
Mobex Network Servs., LLC, 820 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). An abuse of discretion 
occurs only if the decision reviewed rests upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an 
improper application of law to fact. Mancini v. Northampton 
Cty., 836 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 2016). With these principles 
in mind, we turn to the legal standards for the issuance of a 
preliminary injunction. 
III 
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 
granted in limited circumstances. Ferring Pharm., Inc. v. 
Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014). 
Those seeking one must establish that (A) they are likely to 
succeed on the merits of their claims, (B) they are likely to 
suffer irreparable harm without relief, (C) the balance of 
harms favors them, and (D) relief is in the public interest. Id. 
We address each element seriatim. 
A 
We turn first to whether the plaintiffs demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their EEOA and state 
law claims. To satisfy this requirement for preliminary relief, 
the movant need only prove a “prima facie case,” not a 
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“certainty” she’ll win. Highmark, Inc. v. UPMC Health Plan, 
Inc., 276 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2001). We do not require that 
the right to a final decision after trial be “wholly without 
doubt”; the movant need only show a “reasonable 
probability” of success. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 583 
(3d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Singer 
Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (en banc). We address the plaintiffs’ EEOA claims 
first, followed by their state law claims.  
1 
This appeal requires us to interpret § 1703(f) of the 
EEOA, a provision we’ve never addressed and that the 
Supreme Court and our fellow Courts of Appeals have 
infrequently applied. We start where we always do when 
interpreting a statute: with its text. Passed in 1974 as a floor 
amendment to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
of 1965, the EEOA states in § 1703(f) that “[n]o State shall 
deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on 
account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by     
. . . the failure by an educational agency to take appropriate 
action to overcome language barriers that impede equal 
participation by its students in its instructional programs.” 20 
U.S.C. § 1703(f). An “individual” denied an equal 
educational opportunity may bring a civil action in federal 
court “against such parties, and for such relief, as may be 
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appropriate.”5 Id. § 1706. The EEOA limits court-ordered 
remedies to those that are “‘essential to correct particular 
denials of equal educational opportunity.’” Horne v. Flores, 
557 U.S. 433, 450 (2009) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1712).  
Based upon these provisions, we hold that an 
individual alleging a violation of § 1703(f) must satisfy four 
elements: (1) the defendant must be an educational agency, 
(2) the plaintiff must face language barriers impeding her 
equal participation in the defendant’s instructional programs, 
(3) the defendant must have failed to take appropriate action 
to overcome those barriers, and (4) the plaintiff must have 
been denied equal educational opportunity on account of her 
                                              
5 We note there’s no dispute the plaintiffs are 
“individuals” under the EEOA, their refugee status 
notwithstanding. The EEOA was “enacted pursuant to § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment,” Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 
440 n.1 (2009) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1), (b)), and 
entitles “all children enrolled in public schools” equal 
educational opportunity, 20 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (emphasis 
added). It is well established that the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees immigrant children, whatever their legal status, 
equal access to public education. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 
216–24 (1982). 
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race, color, sex, or national origin. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f); 
id. § 1720(a) (defining “educational agency”).6 
Here, there is no dispute the plaintiffs satisfied § 
1703(f)’s first element. The School District does not quibble 
with the District Court’s conclusion that it is an “educational 
agency” under §§ 1703(f) and 1720(a). See Issa, 2016 WL 
4493202, at *1 & n.1. We see no reason to disturb that 
conclusion on appeal, as the EEOA expressly contemplates 
“local educational agencies,” like the School District, in 
defining an “educational agency.” 20 U.S.C. § 1720(a); see 
id. § 7801(30)(A). 
                                              
6 The District Court said that to prevail under § 1703(f), 
a plaintiff need only show “(1) language barriers; (2) 
defendant’s failure to take appropriate action to overcome 
these barriers; and (3) a resulting impediment to students’ 
equal participation in instructional programs.” Issa, 2016 WL 
4493202, at *5. It relied on a Middle District of Pennsylvania 
decision to so hold. Id. (citing CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 888 
F. Supp. 2d 534, 575 (M.D. Pa. 2012)). We affirmed 
judgment in CG but had no occasion to reach the EEOA 
claims at issue there. CG v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 734 F.3d 229 
(3d Cir. 2013). Addressing § 1703(f) directly here for the first 
time, we find this three-element test incomplete. It ignores § 
1703(f)’s “educational agency” and “on account of” 
language. The four-element test we set forth above gives 
proper effect to all of § 1703(f)’s text, as required. See Corley 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (stating that a 
statute “should be construed so that effect is given to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, 
void or insignificant” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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Likewise, there is no genuine dispute the plaintiffs 
satisfied § 1703(f)’s second element. The record here is 
replete with evidence the named plaintiffs, all SLIFE, face 
formidable language barriers. All testified through 
interpreters that they couldn’t understand their content 
courses taught in English at Phoenix. Given this evidence, we 
agree the plaintiffs demonstrated language barriers impeding 
their equal participation in the School District’s instructional 
programs, satisfying § 1703(f)’s second element. See Issa, 
2016 WL 4493202, at *7 n.5 (stating that the parties “do not 
dispute” the plaintiffs’ language barriers and crediting the 
plaintiffs’ testimony that “their participation was impeded”). 
Because elements one and two of § 1703(f)’s prima 
facie case are met, we move to § 1703(f)’s more difficult 
third and fourth elements. 
Section 1703(f)’s Third Element: “Appropriate Action” 
To satisfy § 1703(f)’s third element in the context of a 
preliminary-injunction motion, the plaintiffs must adduce 
evidence of a reasonable probability that the School District 
failed to take “appropriate action” to “overcome” their 
language barriers. Because the EEOA itself doesn’t define 
“appropriate action,” we must look elsewhere for guidance.  
We turn first to the Supreme Court’s decision in Lau v. 
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), issued just before Congress 
passed the EEOA. There, a school district failed to provide 
any English-language instruction to a significant number 
(about 60 percent) of its Chinese students. Id. at 564. Those 
students filed suit, alleging violations of Title VI, which 
restricts federal funding for entities that discriminate based on 
race, color, or national origin. Id. at 565. Finding adequate 
proof of a Title VI violation, the Court stressed the 
importance of language instruction in American education. 
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There is no equality of treatment merely by 
providing students with the same facilities, 
textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for 
students who do not understand English are 
effectively foreclosed from any meaningful 
education. Basic English skills are at the very 
core of what . . . public schools teach. 
Imposition of a requirement that, before a child 
can effectively participate in the educational 
program, he must already have acquired those 
basic skills is to make a mockery of public 
education. We know that those who do not 
understand English are certain to find their 
classroom experiences wholly 
incomprehensible and in no way meaningful. 
Id. at 566. Because no “specific remedy” was requested, the 
Court left that question open, suggesting the school district 
had latitude to decide how it would comply with Title VI: 
“Teaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do 
not speak the language is one choice. Giving instructions to 
this group in Chinese is another. There may be others.” Id. at 
564–65.   
Lau’s pronouncements about Title VI were later called 
into question, and the Supreme Court ultimately recognized 
its abrogation on that ground. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 
U.S. 275, 285 (2001) (“[W]e have since rejected Lau’s 
interpretation of [Title VI.]”). In enacting § 1703(f), however, 
Congress embraced Lau’s “essential holding” that “schools 
are not free to ignore the need of limited English speaking 
children for language assistance.” Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 
1008. 
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Following Lau and § 1703(f)’s enactment, the Fifth 
Circuit handed down Castaneda v. Pickard in 1981. Claiming 
violations of § 1703(f), Mexican-American students sued 
their school district, alleging its failure to implement a 
bilingual-education program impeded their ability to 
overcome language barriers. Id. at 992. Measuring § 1703(f)’s 
reach, the Fifth Circuit found that by using the “less specific 
term, ‘appropriate action,’” Congress left state and local 
authorities a “substantial amount of latitude” to choose the 
“programs and techniques they would use” to satisfy § 
1703(f)’s mandate. Id. at 1008. But too much latitude, the 
court cautioned, would render § 1703(f) a nullity. 
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that state educational 
agencies must make a “genuine and good faith effort, 
consistent with local circumstances and resources, to remedy 
the language deficiencies of their students” under § 1703(f), 
and noted that Congress “deliberately placed on federal courts 
the difficult responsibility of determining whether that 
obligation [is] met.” Id. at 1009. Without guidance from 
Congress on what “appropriate action” looks like, however, 
the Fifth Circuit found itself, like we are now, 
confronted with a type of task which federal 
courts are ill-equipped to perform and which we 
are often criticized for undertaking—
prescribing substantive standards and policies 
for institutions whose governance is properly 
reserved to other levels and branches of our 
government (i.e., state and local educational 
agencies) which are better able to assimilate and 
assess the knowledge of professionals in the 
field. 
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Id. Nevertheless, the court charted a path forward, fashioning 
a “mode of analysis” to fulfill the responsibility Congress 
reposed in the federal courts under § 1703(f) without “unduly 
substituting” its “educational values and theories” for the 
“educational and political decisions” reserved to state and 
local school authorities and the “expert knowledge of 
educators.” Id. That “mode of analysis,” it said, is threefold. 
First, courts  
examine carefully the evidence the record 
contains concerning the soundness of the 
educational theory or principles upon which the 
challenged program is based. This, of course, is 
not to be done with any eye toward discerning 
the relative merits of sound but competing 
bodies of expert educational opinion . . . . The 
court’s responsibility . . . is only to ascertain 
that a school system is [pursuing] a program 
informed by an educational theory recognized 
as sound by some experts in the field or, at 
least, deemed a legitimate experimental 
strategy. 
Id. Second, courts determine whether the programs and 
practices “actually used” by the school system are 
“reasonably calculated to implement effectively the 
educational theory adopted by the school.” Id. at 1010. And 
third, if an otherwise-sound and effectively-implemented 
program fails to “produce results” indicating that language 
barriers are “actually being overcome,” it may “no longer 
constitute appropriate action.” Id. Applying this test, the Fifth 
Circuit found “serious doubts” under prong two about the 
language competency of teachers employed in the school 
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district’s bilingual classrooms and remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1012–13, 1015. 
Courts have consistently followed Castaneda’s 
approach to apply § 1703(f)’s third element, requiring 
“appropriate action.” See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 601 
F.3d 354, 365–73 (5th Cir. 2010); Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln 
High Sch., 618 F.3d 789, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); Gomez v. Ill. 
State Bd. of Educ., 811 F.2d 1030, 1037, 1040–42 (7th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Texas, 680 F.2d 356, 371 (5th Cir. 
1982). And in Horne v. Flores, the Supreme Court relied on 
Castaneda to apply § 1703(f), 557 U.S. at 440–41, 454–55, 
though it did not adopt the Fifth Circuit’s test explicitly, id. at 
458 n.8 (expressing no view on “whether or not this test 
provides much concrete guidance regarding the meaning of 
‘appropriate action’”). Given these decisions and the parties’ 
agreement that Castaneda should here guide our analysis, we 
will apply the Fifth Circuit’s three-part test. Though we 
decline to adopt “without qualification” Castaneda’s 
framework and think “fine tuning must await future cases,” 
we believe this test, as a general matter, properly balances § 
1703(f)’s “allocation of responsibilities between the courts 
and the schools” and hence provides a “fruitful starting point” 
for our analysis under § 1703(f)’s third element. Gomez, 811 
F.2d at 1041.  
Applying Castaneda here to resolve whether the 
School District took “appropriate action” to overcome the 
plaintiffs’ language barriers under § 1703(f), we agree with 
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the District Court: The School District foundered on 
Castaneda’s first and third prongs. We explain why below.7   
Castaneda Prong One 
On Castaneda’s first prong—satisfied where an 
educational agency fails to pursue a program informed by an 
educational theory recognized as sound by some experts in 
the field—the plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability of 
success. Their expert, Dr. Marshall, testified consistently and 
at length that Phoenix’s accelerated, non-sheltered program 
for ELLs is unsound for SLIFE (again, students with limited 
or interrupted formal education). The plaintiffs and two 
former Phoenix teachers corroborated her testimony. The 
School District did not rebut it with another expert or through 
contrary research. We see no clear error here.    
SLIFE, Dr. Marshall emphasized, generally struggle or 
have yet to learn to read or write in any language, including 
                                              
7 Because the District Court concluded Phoenix’s 
accelerated, non-sheltered program doesn’t satisfy 
Castaneda’s first and third prongs, it didn’t address 
Castaneda’s second prong—whether the programs and 
practices actually used by the School District are reasonably 
calculated to implement effectively the educational theory 
adopted. This wasn’t error. The District Court was right that 
Castaneda’s test is “conjunctive.” Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at 
*6. All three prongs must be met for an educational agency’s 
program to satisfy § 1703(f)’s “appropriate action” element. 
See Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009–10. While we thank the 
United States as amicus curiae for its thoughtful analysis of 
Castaneda’s second prong, given the plaintiffs’ successful 
showings under prongs one and three, we need not and do not 
reach Castaneda’s second prong here.   
26 
 
their native languages. Not only must they learn English in 
American schools, she explained, they must learn how to 
learn there. See J.A. 651 (“[W]e have to teach [SLIFE] for 
the first time how to read in a language that isn’t even a 
language they speak yet.”); J.A. 652 (describing how teaching 
in the United States relies on “decontextualized tasks”—
multiple choice, matching, and true-false questions—that 
foreign students are “completely unaware of”). Dr. Marshall 
said that for SLIFE to succeed, teaching must “go more 
slowly and build, build the language, build the literacy,” and 
“fill in the gaps.” J.A. 656. This testimony went 
unchallenged.  
Given SLIFE’s need for unhurried and deliberate 
literacy and language development, Dr. Marshall opined that 
Phoenix’s accelerated curriculum is “totally inappropriate” 
for them. Id.; see J.A. 671 (“For SLIFE . . . it is 
contraindicated. It is the opposite of what they need.”). 
Students like the plaintiffs who are “behind academically” 
and “don’t understand English,” she explained, “cannot be 
expected to go faster through content when they haven’t 
reached a threshold of English.” J.A. 656. Her view, she 
attested, accords with those of other experts in the field. She 
was unaware of any contrary research, and the School District 
didn’t point to any. “Uniformly,” she said, “the field in 
talking about [SLIFE] talks about going more slowly, 
building in redundancy, building in repetition, and having 
them become familiar with material in many different ways in 
order for them to learn it, and not to go at double time.” Id. 
(emphasis added); see J.A. 658 (“Again and again they say 
the key is to take your time, present [the material] in a variety 
of ways, make sure they get it . . . and nobody is talking about 
accelerating.”). No evidence was presented that an 
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accelerated curriculum, on its own, is accepted as sound 
educational theory for SLIFE. 
Dr. Marshall also opined consistently that “sheltered 
instruction” content classes, like those offered at the 
International School, are “needed” for SLIFE, J.A. 661–63, 
667, and that Phoenix’s commingling of SLIFE with higher-
level ELLs and native English speakers, when combined with 
accelerated content courses, is not accepted as sound 
educational theory, J.A. 666 (“[I]f you’re going to try and 
have newcomers with very little English . . . mixed in with 
fluid English speakers . . . what happens is that it becomes 
overwhelming for the lower level ELLs.”); see J.A. 667 
(“SLIFE need an entire day of instruction that’s tailored to 
them.”); J.A. 669 (“[W]hen [SLIFE are] in their content 
classes with native speakers . . . they’re not understanding 
what’s happening, they’re really not progressing, they’re not 
moving forward . . . [b]ecause they’re not actually learning 
the material.”). Here too, no evidence was adduced that 
accelerated, unsheltered instruction is accepted as sound 
educational theory for SLIFE. The plaintiffs’ own testimony, 
cited extensively above, confirmed their great difficulty in 
understanding their accelerated, non-sheltered content classes 
at Phoenix.  
Former Phoenix teacher Jandy Rivera reinforced Dr. 
Marshall’s and the plaintiffs’ testimony, explaining that her 
“refugee students” were “not able to master the material” in 
Phoenix’s accelerated, non-sheltered program. J.A. 633. She 
stated that “[a]t the fast pace and atmosphere at Phoenix,” 
refugee students were “not able to learn”; that these students 
“needed a regularly paced atmosphere, or perhaps even an 
extended learning atmosphere in order to master the 
material”; and that in her experience, Phoenix’s program 
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“didn’t work” for newly arrived ELLs. Id. Phoenix’s lead-
ESL teacher, Marianne Ortiz, similarly corroborated Dr. 
Marshall’s testimony, stating that the International School is a 
“better placement for entering students” because it’s not 
“accelerated” and gives ELLs “sheltered [instruction] content 
classes.” J.A. 837. Given this evidence, we see no clear error 
in the District Court’s findings that 
[w]hen a student with no ability to speak or 
understand English, such as the plaintiffs, is 
placed in accelerated classes, the student will 
cover material twice as fast as a normal school, 
but that material is also taught in a language 
that student does not understand. On its face, 
this practice appears to be counterintuitive; 
expert testimony confirmed that the practice 
was unsound . . . . The District did not offer any 
expert to the contrary. Instead, the District 
offered its ESL Coordinator [Amber Hilt], who 
testified that the “structured immersion” 
technique is a sound theory generally for 
overcoming language barriers, but nothing 
persuasive to the court to contradict Dr. 
Marshall’s testimony that this technique was 
not recognized as sound for an accelerated, 
credit-recovery program. The Phoenix model of 
accelerated learning presents different 
language barriers than a traditional education 
program, and is particularly imposing for 
students who cannot yet understand the 
language in which the courses are taught. 
Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *3, *6 (emphasis added).  
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 On appeal, the School District attempts merely to 
impeach the credibility of Dr. Marshall’s testimony. It points 
out, for example, that Dr. Marshall “neglected” to “personally 
observe” Phoenix’s “classrooms/environments,” although 
Rivera and Ortiz and all six named plaintiffs reinforced her 
testimony. Appellant’s Br. 43. It says Dr. Marshall was a 
mere “teacher of teachers,” not an ESL instructor, without 
explaining why that might render the District Court’s reliance 
on her testimony clearly erroneous. Id. And it says Dr. 
Marshall contradicted herself when she testified that 
“immersion” of ELLs in content classes with native speakers 
impeded their progress, not necessarily acceleration. Id. at 44. 
But when we consider the record en bloc, these alleged 
blemishes in Dr. Marshall’s testimony fail to persuade us that 
the District Court’s findings are “completely devoid of 
minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue of 
credibility” or bear “no rational relationship to the supportive 
evidentiary data,” as required to show clear error. Havens, 
820 F.3d at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 For these reasons, the District Court did not err in 
concluding that the plaintiffs showed a reasonable probability 
that Phoenix’s accelerated, non-sheltered program isn’t 
informed by an educational theory recognized as sound by 
some experts in the field, as required under Castaneda’s first 
prong.  
Castaneda Prong Three 
On Castaneda’s third prong—satisfied where an 
educational agency’s programs fail to produce results 
indicating that language barriers are actually being 
overcome—we agree with the District Court that the plaintiffs 
demonstrated a likelihood of success. The evidence shows 
that the School District doesn’t keep separate data on the 
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efficacy of Phoenix’s ESL program. This rendered it difficult, 
if not impossible, for the District Court to ascertain whether 
the plaintiffs’ language barriers were actually being overcome 
at Phoenix. Given this evidence, we see no clear error in the 
District Court’s findings, unchallenged on appeal, that 
[u]ndisputed testimony offered in court shows 
that the District does not evaluate whether the 
“language barriers confronting students are 
actually being overcome” at Phoenix [as 
required by Castaneda]. The ESL Coordinator 
[Hilt] acknowledged that “there is no data . . . 
that would allow us to determine whether . . . 
the ESL delivered to these students in . . . 
Phoenix[’s] accelerated model is working or 
not.” [J.A. 734.] Because the District did not 
disaggregate the Phoenix data to make this 
assessment, it could not demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the program to the court. 
Through her own efforts, Dr. Marshall was able 
to discern from limited data provided by the 
District that Phoenix’s performance on literacy 
measures—the core measure of “overcoming 
language barriers”—was far worse than 
McCaskey’s. 
Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *6. The School District’s 
Superintendent, Dr. Damaris Rau, confirmed that the 
effectiveness of Phoenix’s ESL program had yet to be 
evaluated. J.A. 746–47. This further supports the District 
Court’s findings.  
On appeal, the School District argues Phoenix’s ESL 
instruction “is and continues to be successful.” Appellant’s 
Br. 44. To bolster that point, it notes that one named plaintiff, 
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Anyemu Dunia, graduated from Phoenix and read an essay 
aloud in court, while “many” other unspecified ELLs have 
gone on to college after graduating Phoenix. Id. (citing J.A. 
627). Though he could read an essay aloud in court, the 
District Court found that Anyemu had “readily apparent 
difficulties conversing in English,” Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, 
at *3 n.2, and Anyemu himself testified that he could only 
“catch . . . some word[s]” when his English-speaking teachers 
talked to him in class, J.A. 620. Even if we were to accept this 
as sufficient indicia of Anyemu’s progress, his ability to read 
a portion of an essay in court says nothing about whether the 
other four named plaintiffs were overcoming their own 
language barriers at Phoenix. The record here amply supports 
the District Court’s conclusion that they were not. As 
explained before, all testified they couldn’t understand what 
their teachers and classmates were saying in their content 
classes at Phoenix. This argument therefore fails to show 
clear error. 
We also find unavailing the School District’s 
contention, in its papers and at oral argument, that an ELL’s 
ability to graduate Phoenix, on its own, weighs in the School 
District’s favor under § 1703(f). On this record, we see little 
evidence of a meaningful connection between ELLs 
graduating from Phoenix’s accelerated, non-sheltered 
program and ELLs actually overcoming their language 
barriers there. On the contrary, there is ample evidence 
supporting the District Court’s finding that “[a]lthough the 
student earns (or at least is issued) a diploma and all of the 
attendant benefits, the student will likely graduate [Phoenix] 
with limited ability, if any, to converse in English—also often 
a prerequisite to future advancement—and limited 
understanding of the content of the courses he actually took.” 
Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *3. We therefore conclude that 
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the plaintiffs showed a likelihood that Phoenix’s program 
fails to produce results indicating that their language barriers 
are actually being overcome, as required under Castaneda’s 
third prong.  
Because the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success 
under Castaneda’s three-part test, they met § 1703(f)’s third 
element, requiring proof that the School District failed to take 
“appropriate action” to “overcome” their language barriers.  
Section 1703(f)’s Fourth Element: “On Account of” a 
Protected Characteristic 
We now address § 1703(f)’s fourth and final element, 
which requires proof the plaintiffs were denied equal 
educational opportunity on account of their race, color, sex, 
or national origin. See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(f). We hold they met 
this element.  
The Supreme Court has yet to address how the 
preamble to § 1703, which includes the “on account of” 
language here in issue, interacts with the rest of § 1703 and 
subsection (f) in particular. The Court did not discuss the 
matter in Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, so we look 
elsewhere. In its entirety, § 1703 provides that 
[n]o State shall deny equal educational 
opportunity to an individual on account of his 
or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by— 
(a) the deliberate segregation by an 
educational agency of students on the basis of 
race, color, or national origin among or within 
schools;  
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(b) the failure of an educational agency which 
has formerly practiced such deliberate 
segregation to take affirmative steps, 
consistent with part 4 of this subchapter, to 
remove the vestiges of a dual school system;  
(c) the assignment by an educational agency of 
a student to a school, other than the one closest 
to his or her place of residence within the 
school district in which he or she resides, if the 
assignment results in a greater degree of 
segregation of students on the basis of race, 
color, sex, or national origin among the 
schools of such agency than would result if 
such student were assigned to the school 
closest to his or her place of residence within 
the school district of such agency providing 
the appropriate grade level and type of 
education for such student;  
(d) discrimination by an educational agency 
on the basis of race, color, or national origin in 
the employment, employment conditions, or 
assignment to schools of its faculty or staff, 
except to fulfill the purposes of subsection (f) 
below;  
(e) the transfer by an educational agency, 
whether voluntary or otherwise, of a student 
from one school to another if the purpose and 
effect of such transfer is to increase 
segregation of students on the basis of race, 
color, or national origin among the schools of 
such agency; or  
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(f) the failure by an educational agency to take 
appropriate action to overcome language 
barriers that impede equal participation by its 
students in its instructional programs. 
The School District suggests § 1703’s preamble 
requires the plaintiffs to prove it failed to take appropriate 
action to overcome their language barriers on account of their 
national origins under § 1703(f). The School District 
interprets “on account of” to require a showing of intentional 
discrimination, contending there’s insufficient evidence the 
plaintiffs’ national origins “motivated their placement at 
Phoenix.” Reply Br. 3–4.8 We reject this reading of § 1703. 
We start with what § 1703(f) doesn’t require when 
read together with § 1703’s “on account of” language: a 
showing of discrimination of any kind, intentional or 
otherwise, on account of an EEOA-protected characteristic. 
Congress expressly included the word “discrimination” in § 
                                              
8 The School District raised this argument only in 
passing in the District Court and for the first time on appeal in 
its reply brief. We could therefore consider it waived. See 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33, 53 (3d Cir. 
2016) (arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are 
waived on appeal); P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, 
Inc., 808 F.3d 221, 224 n.1 (3d Cir. 2015) (arguments not 
squarely put before the district court are waived on appeal). 
But the School District’s “on account of” argument turns on a 
pure question of law about a matter of public importance, so 
we’ll exercise our discretion to consider it. See Huber v. 
Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006); Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 
F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2005); Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 
186, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 1988). 
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1703(d) but omitted it from § 1703(f). See Castaneda, 648 
F.2d at 1007–08. And in subsections (a) and (e) of § 1703, 
Congress explicitly required showings of “deliberate” and 
“purpose[ful]” conduct, but merely required proof of a 
“fail[ure]” to take appropriate action under § 1703(f). See id. 
Where Congress “includes particular language in one section 
of a statute”—here, the word “discrimination” and language 
connoting intentional conduct in subsections (a), (d), and 
(e)—but “omits it in another section of the same Act”—here, 
subsection (f)—we presume it acted “intentionally and 
purposely” in so doing. Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 
573 (2009); see Bd. of Trustees of IBT Local 863 Pension 
Fund v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 802 F.3d 534, 545 
(3d Cir. 2015). We therefore join the Fifth Circuit in holding 
that § 1703(f) prohibits the mere failure by an educational 
agency to take appropriate action to overcome students’ 
language barriers, “regardless of whether such a failure is 
motivated by an intent to discriminate against those students.” 
Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1008. And we add that, because § 
1703(f) doesn’t say “discrimination,” there’s no requirement 
under it to prove discrimination of any kind, including, for 
example, disparate impact discrimination.9 This reading 
                                              
9 The School District’s argument is premised on the 
notion that “on account of” in § 1703’s preamble not only 
modifies the denial of “equal educational opportunity” but 
also the particular state action or inaction proscribed in each 
of § 1703’s subsections. The statute’s language, however, 
doesn’t support that reading. The preamble merely states a 
general prohibition on the denial of equal educational 
opportunity “on account of” a protected characteristic 
violated per se “by” the state acting or failing to act in 
accordance with subsections (a) through (f). Each subsection 
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thus creates a separate cause of action for the denial of equal 
educational opportunity on account of an EEOA-protected 
characteristic, and none requires proof that the state’s action 
or inaction was itself “on account of” such a characteristic.  
The School District’s reading also fails to distinguish 
between the phrase “on the basis of” a protected 
characteristic—which Congress has used traditionally and in 
this very statute to designate discriminatory intent, see §§ 
1702(a)(1), 1703(a), (e)—and the phrase “on account of” a 
protected characteristic, which we presume, consistent with 
basic canons of statutory construction, Congress used 
intentionally in § 1703’s preamble to convey a different 
meaning. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711 n.9 
(2004); William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 568 F.3d 425, 
435 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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accords with the Supreme Court’s observation in Horne, 557 
U.S. at 472, that § 1703(f) requires educational agencies to 
“tak[e] ‘appropriate action’ to teach English to students who 
grew up speaking another language,” and with Lau’s 
“essential holding” that “schools are not free to ignore the 
                                                                                                     
Further, as applied to § 1703’s other subsections, the 
School District’s “on account of” interpretation would violate 
two more canons of construction. First, it would render 
portions of § 1703(a), (c), and (d) superfluous by requiring a 
plaintiff to prove that the “segregation” or “discrimination” 
these subsections already specify was “on the basis of race, 
color, or national origin” and “on account of race, color, sex, 
or national origin.” See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 
561, 574 (1995); Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 
170, 185 (3d Cir. 2013). Second, it would render § 1703(b) 
and (e) nonsensical by requiring a plaintiff to establish both 
that the state failed to affirmatively remediate the disparate 
impact of past discrimination on the basis of race, color, or 
national origin and that the failure itself was “on account of    
. . . race, color, sex, or national origin.” See Corley, 556 U.S. 
at 314; G.L. v. Ligonier Valley Sch. Dist. Auth., 802 F.3d 601, 
615 (3d Cir. 2015). We therefore reject the School District’s 
reading of § 1703’s “on account of” language.   
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need of limited English speaking children for language 
assistance,” Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1008.10 
We end with what § 1703(f) does require when read 
together with § 1703’s “on account of” language: a nexus 
between the lost educational opportunity alleged and an 
EEOA-protected characteristic. Stated differently, we hold 
that the denial of the equal educational opportunity—in § 
1703(f)’s case, the language barrier that is not being 
overcome—must stem from race, color, sex, or national 
origin, rather than from, for example, a cognitive disability 
covered by a different remedial scheme, like the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 
Applying this reading here, we conclude the record fully 
supports that the plaintiffs’ language barriers, and hence their 
                                              
10 The School District says the Eighth Circuit’s 2010 
decision in Mumid v. Abraham Lincoln High School, 618 
F.3d 789, controls this issue. It doesn’t. Specifically, the 
School District points to Mumid’s statement that a “policy 
that treats students with limited English proficiency 
differently than other students . . . does not facially 
discriminate based on national origin.” Id. at 795. The School 
District omits, however, that the Eighth Circuit said that in 
addressing Title VI claims, not EEOA claims. See id. at 793–
95. When the Court of Appeals dealt with the students’ 
EEOA claims in Mumid, it did so on standing grounds, noting 
expressly that it would “assume” without deciding that 
evidence of the school’s failure to take appropriate action to 
overcome language barriers “could support a finding that the 
District denied equal educational opportunity ‘on account of   
. . . national origin.’” Id. at 795–96 (emphasis added). Mumid 
therefore doesn’t support—and actually hurts—the School 
District’s position.   
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lost educational opportunities, stem from their national 
origins.  
Thus, the plaintiffs satisfied § 1703(f)’s fourth 
element, as they were denied equal educational opportunity 
“on account of” an EEOA-protected characteristic: their 
national origins. Given the plaintiffs’ successful showings 
under all four of § 1703(f)’s elements, we agree with the 
District Court that they demonstrated a likelihood of success 
on their EEOA claims.  
2 
We turn now to whether the plaintiffs demonstrated a 
reasonable probability of success on the merits of their state 
law claims. Because neither the plaintiffs nor the District 
Court addressed the threshold question whether the plaintiffs’ 
state law claims are cognizable, we’ll remand for the District 
Court to consider that question in the first instance. 
In Pennsylvania, every child who hasn’t graduated 
from high school “may attend” the public schools in her 
district until the end of the school year in which she turns 21. 
24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1301; see 22 Pa. Code §§ 11.12, 12.1(a). “A 
child’s right to be admitted to school may not be conditioned 
on the child’s immigration status.” 22 Pa. Code § 11.11(d). A 
school district “shall normally enroll a child the next business 
day, but no later than [within] 5 business days of application.” 
Id. § 11.11(b). The District Court concluded the plaintiffs 
showed likely violations of these state laws because none was 
enrolled within five days and one—Alembe Dunia—was 
“still not enrolled” when the injunction issued. Issa, 2016 WL 
4493202, at *5. 
While the School District’s enrollment delays are 
indeed troubling, we must conclude the District Court erred 
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as a matter of law in finding that the plaintiffs showed a 
likelihood of success on their state law claims. Unlike the 
EEOA, which explicitly grants “individual[s]” the right to 
“institute a civil action” in court for equitable relief, 20 
U.S.C. §§ 1706, 1713, our de novo review reveals nothing in 
24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1301 or elsewhere in the Public School Code 
that expressly grants individuals, like students or their 
parents, a private cause of action to enforce the statute in 
court through equitable remedies.11 See 24 Pa. Stat. §§ 1-101 
to 27-2702. Likewise, 22 Pa. Code § 11.11(b), a regulation 
promulgated by Pennsylvania’s State Board of Education, 
doesn’t expressly grant private litigants a cause of action to 
                                              
11 In its entirety, 24 Pa. Stat. § 13-1301 states that 
[e]very child, being a resident of any school 
district, between the ages of six (6) and twenty-
one (21) years, may attend the public schools in 
his district, subject to the provisions of this act. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to 
the contrary, a child who attains the age of 
twenty-one (21) years during the school term 
and who has not graduated from high school 
may continue to attend the public schools in his 
district free of charge until the end of the school 
term. The board of school directors of any 
school district may admit to the schools of the 
district, with or without the payment of tuition, 
any non-resident child temporarily residing in 
the district, and may require the attendance of 
such non-resident child in the same manner and 
on the same conditions as it requires the 
attendance of a resident child. 
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remedy enrollment delays or denials in court through 
equitable relief, assuming a regulation can ever do so under 
Pennsylvania law.12  
In the absence of an express private cause of action 
under a Pennsylvania statute, we look to whether the statute 
“implicitly” creates one. Estate of Witthoeft v. Kiskaddon, 733 
A.2d 623, 626 (Pa. 1999) (emphasis added). When there’s 
sufficient indicia of the General Assembly’s intent, 
Pennsylvania courts have recognized the possibility of 
implied private causes of action and remedies stemming from 
state statutes that don’t expressly provide for them. See, e.g., 
Schappell v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 934 A.2d 1184, 1188–
90 (Pa. 2007) (inferring a private cause of action from 
Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law); 
Estate of Witthoeft, 733 A.2d at 625–28 (declining to infer a 
private cause of action from Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle 
                                              
12 In its entirety, 22 Pa. Code § 11.11(b) states that 
[a] school district or charter school shall 
normally enroll a child the next business day, 
but no later than 5 business days of application. 
The school district or charter school has no 
obligation to enroll a child until the parent, 
guardian or other person having control or 
charge of the student making the application has 
supplied proof of the child’s age, residence, and 
immunizations as required by law. School 
districts and charter schools receiving requests 
for educational records from another school 
district or charter school shall forward the 
records within 10 business days of receipt of the 
request. 
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Code and regulations); Solomon v. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of 
Pa., Inc., 797 A.2d 346, 352–53 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) 
(finding no implied private cause of action under 
Pennsylvania’s Health Care Act). Here, to the extent 
Pennsylvania decisions can be read to support an implied 
private cause of action, they suggest that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies may be required in the first instance. 
See Velazquez ex rel. Speaks-Velazquez v. E. Stroudsburg 
Area Sch. Dist., 949 A.2d 354, 360 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008). 
But neither the District Court nor the parties cited any 
authority concerning the viability of an administrative 
exhaustion requirement or an implied private cause of action 
for equitable relief stemming from the Pennsylvania statute 
and regulations in issue. The District Court thus implicitly 
assumed such a private cause of action and remedy may be so 
inferred without exhaustion of administrative remedies.  
Without any briefing on these issues—which appear to 
be matters of first impression under Pennsylvania law—we 
decline to resolve them. We’ll leave them for the District 
Court to address in the first instance on remand, assuming 
they’re raised by the parties. See Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 
172, 182 (3d Cir. 2015) (leaving legal questions not reached 
in the district court and not briefed on appeal “for the District 
Court to address in the first instance on remand”). Suffice it 
to say that, without any analysis of whether the plaintiffs can 
bring private causes of action for equitable relief without 
exhausting administrative remedies under these state laws, the 
District Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the 
plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their state law claims. 
We note, however, that nothing about the District 
Court’s preliminary-injunction order relies specifically on a 
conclusion that the plaintiffs proved likely violations of 
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Pennsylvania law. Thus, we need not vacate any part of it on 
that ground. And even without proving likely violations of 
state law, the plaintiffs’ successful showings under the EEOA 
may support a preliminary injunction. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 
1713 (contemplating equitable relief for EEOA violations). 
We therefore proceed to the next element they must prove to 
justify one—irreparable harm. 
B 
A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must prove 
irreparable harm is “likely” in the absence of relief. Winter v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008); see 
Ferring Pharm., 765 F.3d at 213–14, 217. 
We agree with the District Court that without 
preliminary relief, irreparable harm was likely for these 
plaintiffs, who would have remained in Phoenix’s 
accelerated, non-sheltered program for at least the duration of 
this litigation. The plaintiffs already demonstrated a 
reasonable probability that Phoenix’s programs are unsound 
for them and fail to actually overcome their language barriers 
under the EEOA. And these plaintiffs, all SLIFE, must 
overcome uniquely difficult challenges to learning. Time is of 
the essence: Their eligibility to attend public school in 
Pennsylvania is dwindling. We recognize that a sound 
educational program has power to “change the trajectory of a 
child’s life,” G.L. v. Ligonier Valley School District 
Authority, 802 F.3d 601, 625 (3d Cir. 2015), while even a 
“few months” in an unsound program can make a “world of 
difference in harm” to a child’s educational development, 
Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 121–22 (1st 
Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (noting the “lasting impact of 
[education’s] deprivation on the life of the child”). In 
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accordance with this injunction, moreover, four named 
plaintiffs now attend McCaskey, where they say they’re 
“flourishing.” Appellees’ Br. 45 n.11. Jockeying them back to 
Phoenix now would thus cause them greater harm, as the 
School District conceded during oral argument. Given these 
factors, we are satisfied the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of 
irreparable harm absent this injunction. 
C 
We must now balance the parties’ relative harms; that 
is, the potential injury to the plaintiffs without this injunction 
versus the potential injury to the defendant with it in place. 
Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 596 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 We already identified the irreparable harm the 
plaintiffs would likely suffer absent this injunction. And we 
agree with the District Court that the School District has “no 
interest in continuing practices” that violate § 1703(f) of the 
EEOA. Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *8. The School District 
argues the plaintiffs fail on this element because the 
injunction “permits usurpation” of its “decisionmaking 
authority” to place “older, non-credited students where they 
can best be educated,” which could lead to “future litigation” 
in other unspecified “areas of . . . discretion” and to the 
“erosion” of unspecified “authority and funds.” Appellant’s 
Br. 54. The record before us, however, belies the School 
District’s contention that Phoenix is where the plaintiffs “can 
best be educated.” Under the EEOA, we reject an educational 
agency’s call for unfettered decision-making authority when 
its programs fall short of § 1703(f)’s mandate. See Gomez, 
811 F.2d at 1041 (“[W]e cannot accord such sweeping 
deference to state and local agencies that judicial review 
becomes in practice judicial abdication.”). By the School 
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District’s own representations, we know only eight students 
transferred from Phoenix to McCaskey after the preliminary 
injunction issued: four named plaintiffs and four similarly 
situated students. The School District therefore retains 
substantial “decisionmaking authority” over the affairs of the 
vast majority of its students, this injunction notwithstanding. 
We agree with the District Court that the balance of harms 
favors the plaintiffs.    
D 
Finally, we must weigh whether the public interest 
favors this preliminary injunction. Doing so is “often fairly 
routine.” Kos Pharm., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 730 
(3d Cir. 2004). If a plaintiff proves “both” a likelihood of 
success on the merits and irreparable injury, it “almost always 
will be the case” that the public interest favors preliminary 
relief. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, 
Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994). The District 
Court found that it’s “undeniably in the public interest for 
providers of public education to comply with the 
requirements” of the EEOA. Issa, 2016 WL 4493202, at *8 
(internal quotation marks omitted). We agree. Preliminary 
relief is in the public interest here. 
* * * 
Because the plaintiffs showed they’re likely to succeed 
on the merits of their EEOA claims, they’re likely to suffer 
irreparable harm without relief, the balance of harms favors 
them, and relief is in the public interest, we hold the District 
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Court did not abuse its discretion in granting their 
preliminary-injunction motion.13  
IV 
For the reasons explained above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s preliminary-injunction order and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
                                              
13 Though we will affirm this preliminary-injunction 
order, we recognize that significant administrative and 
budgetary implications may arise when a federal court orders 
the transfer of students across a school district. We note the 
School District wasn’t given the opportunity to propose its 
own remedy before the injunction issued. While the timing of 
the injunction right before the start of the school year may 
have made alternative relief impracticable at that time, the 
District Court should allow the School District an opportunity 
to propose a legally compliant solution, among other 
alternatives considered by the Court, before the issuance of 
any permanent injunction, if the plaintiffs ultimately succeed 
on the merits of their EEOA claims. See Horne, 557 U.S. at 
454 (stating that the EEOA, “while requiring a State to take 
‘appropriate action to overcome language barriers,’” leaves 
state and local educational authorities a “‘substantial amount 
of latitude in choosing’ how this obligation is met” (quoting 
Castaneda, 648 F.2d at 1009)). 
